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A B S T R A C T   
The recent phenomenon of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) is associated with what has been described as a 
global agrarian transition. New forms of land exploitation and concentration have led to profound socio- 
environmental transformations of rural production systems in Latin America, South-East Asia and Sub Saharan 
Africa. Scholars have pointed out that the expansion of transnational land investments is often associated with 
detrimental social outcomes, has negative environmental impacts and can represent a potential impediment to 
the achievement of many SDGs. In this paper, our primary concern is on the mounting evidence that LSLAs 
preferentially target the commons, in the process altering long-standing customary resource governance systems. 
While it has been shown that in many instances of commons grabbing associated with LSLAs, different types of 
social conflict emerge, it is less clear what forms of social mobilization and organized collective re-actions are 
taking place to defend the commons and contest such processes of dispossession and enclosure. The main aim of 
this contribution is to fill this gap by synthesizing and describing the different typologies of social mobilization 
and collective re-actions that emerge as a result of commons grabbing associated with the transnational 
expansion of the agribusiness frontier. In order to do this our research synthesizes information from the Envi-
ronmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas) shedding light on some of the key characteristics associated with the different 
forms and dynamics of social mobilization that are organized in reaction to agribusiness-related commons 
grabbing.   
1. Introduction 
The history of capitalism is a history of enclosures of the commons 
(Linebaugh, 2009). Dispossession of the commons is a process that can 
be traced back to different historical moments. Commons dispossession 
has been associated with the alienation of small-scale farmers, tradi-
tional land users and indigenous people from the land and the natural 
resources that support their systems of production and identity, and in a 
broader sense, their existence (Perelman, 2007; Wily, 2011a, 2011b, 
2012, 2013). An infamous depiction of injustice, subjugation, violence 
and eradication is the leitmotif of colonialism that echoes and resounds 
in many of the dynamics of contemporary neoliberal globalization 
(Harvey, 2005; Glassman, 2006). This wave of coercion, dispossession 
and “commons grabbing” gained new momentum with what has been 
recently described as a new “global land rush” (Borras et al., 2011; 
Cotula, 2012)). The year 2008 was a watershed moment in this process. 
The triple interwoven conjuncture of the financial, climatic and food 
security crises triggered an escalating expansion of transnational Large- 
Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs). LSLAs have become a structural 
component of agribusiness development and are playing a central role in 
the redefinition of the key features of the current global agrarian tran-
sition (Cotula, 2012; Messerli et al., 2014; Davis et al., 2020; Müller 
et al., 2021). Some estimates exceed 48 million hectares of arable land (i. 
e., more than five times the entire area of Portugal) acquired globally 
since then (The Land Matrix 2020). 
It is clear that in this reconfiguration of the relations of land, natural 
resources, and people, is the commodification force which subordinates 
social relations and the natural environment in which they develop, to 
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the economic system (Polanyi, 1944; Cotula, 2013). This “new frontier 
in historical shifts between social embeddedness and commodification 
in land relations” (Cotula, 2013: p. 1623) is happening through social 
dynamics that are characterized by evident imbalanced power relations, 
conflict and violence (e.g Linebaugh, 2009; De Angelis, 2012; Caffentzis 
and Federici, 2014; Federici and Linebaugh, 2018). 
The social implications of LSLAs have been thoroughly discussed in 
an emerging body of scholarship on land and water grabbing (see special 
issues in The Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 2012; Water 
Alternatives, 2012; Development and Change, 2013; Globalisations, 
2013; The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2012; Third World Quarterly, 
2013; Dell’Angelo et al., 2018). A meta-study of this literature showed 
that the large majority of the cases of land acquisitions happened in 
contexts of small-scale farming usually under common property regimes 
or multiple ownership claims and that coercion was a key dynamic 
(Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). This meta-analytical synthesis pointed at 
“commons grabbing” as a central dimension of the contemporary global 
land rush. The result is not surprising considering that most LSLAs are 
happening in countries where communal and customary land entitle-
ments and management are prevalent (De Schutter, 2011; Fuys et al., 
2008; Kugelman, 2012; Pearce, 2012; Wily, 2011a, 2011b). Very often, 
small-scale farmers and traditional natural resource users rely on land 
that is governed by customary, and indigenous systems of common 
property. For instance, it has been estimated that almost 70% of all the 
land in sub-Saharan Africa, can be categorized as customary common 
property and community-based tenure regimes (Deininger, 2003; Wily, 
2011a, 2011b, 2012). 
A fundamental question associated with the study of the contem-
porary global land rush that has been raised is ‘what are the political 
reactions from below’? (Hall et al., 2015: 1). A collection of articles 
published in the special issue Global land grabbing and political reactions 
‘from below’ address this question looking at the wider responses that go 
beyond direct resistance and include different types of forms of mobi-
lization and counter-mobilization in different case studies (The Journal 
of Peasant Studies, 2015). 
Complementing this work, the objective of this paper is to deepen the 
scope of analysis and provide a new systematic synthesis and charac-
terization of the different dynamics of social mobilization that emerge as 
a result of commons grabbing specifically associated with global agri-
business expansion. We do this by analyzing data from the Environ-
mental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas1). The paper is structured as follows, 
Section 2 introduces the theoretical background by referring to an 
operational definition of commons grabbing and reviewing different 
theories of resistance; Section 3 explains our methods of analysis and 
provides information on the EJAtlas and data selection criteria; Section 
4 illustrates the results of the synthesis; in Section 5 we discuss some 
theoretical reflections on the patterns emerging from our analysis; we 
finally conclude with some overarching reflections on the meaning of 
this study in Section 6. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Commons grabbing: an operational definition 
The Ostromian approach explains the commons combining bio-
physical and institutional perspectives. The notion of commons is often 
analytically explained from the biophysical perspective (eg. Ostrom 
et al., 1994), from the political-institutional one (eg. Velicu and García- 
López, 2018) or from the combination of both perspectives (Cole and 
Ostrom, 2012). Ostrom et al. (2002) clarify the importance to distin-
guish between common-pool resources and common property regimes. 
Common-pool resources are types of goods that are usually identified 
based on the double simultaneous characteristic of high difficulty of 
exclusion (i.e. it is difficult to exclude others from appropriation or use 
of the considered resource) and high subtractability (or rivalry) (i.e. the 
appropriation or use by an agent/s reduces the ability of another agent/s 
to benefit from the same resource) (Ostrom et al., 1994). Common 
property regimes in contrast are an institutional category. Since the 
classic Roman jurisprudence, the main four categories of institutional 
arrangements and property systems have been described as private, 
public, common property and open access. Cole & Ostrom, (2012: 42) 
explain that in common property systems “each member of the ownership 
group has the right to access and use group-owned resources in accordance 
with access and use rules established collectively by the group, and a duty not 
to violate access and use rules”. However, it is rare that these categorical 
definitions perfectly fit real-world cases because generally institution-
ally hybrid situations and overlapping property regimes are diffused 
(Dasgupta, 1995; Wily, 2011a). For example, the land is often de jure 
property of the government while de facto managed and used through 
customary, collective, community-based rules of access, use and exclu-
sion (D’alisa, 2013; Villamayor-Tomas and García-López, 2018). 
Nevertheless, resources such as forests, rangelands, fisheries and 
groundwater have the defining biophysical features of common-pool 
resources (high difficulty to exclude and high subtractability) and are 
often governed (yet not exclusively) through common property regimes 
and customary or indigenous practices. It is on this specific intersection 
between natural resources and institutional arrangements that much of 
the traditional literature on the commons has focused (eg. Ostrom, 1990; 
Dietz et al., 2003; Armitage, 2005; Cox et al., 2010). 
Dell’Angelo et al. (2017) build on different political economy and 
political ecology perspectives (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Agrawal, 2005; 
Clement, 2010; Poteete et al., 2010; Borras et al., 2011; Ostrom, 2011) to 
propose an operational heuristic framework associated with the defini-
tion of grabbed commons. This definition has been specifically devel-
oped to address the issue of ‘commons grabbing’ in the context of the 
contemporary global land rush and agrarian transition with specific 
attention to transnational agribusiness development (see Fig. 1). The 
authors articulate their analysis of commons-grabbing in three di-
mensions. The first dimension is related to the type of agricultural sys-
tem of production, ranging from small-scale/subsistence to commercial/ 
speculative. The second dimension is related to different institutional 
regimes and includes the different types of property systems and claims 
on the land that exist in a given place. The third dimension refers to 
coercion as a constitutive condition of commons grabbing. 
According to this framework, commons are grabbed when large- 
scale land investments target land that is claimed by a multiplicity of 
Fig. 1. Multidimensional definition of commons grabbing from Dell’Angelo 
et al., 2017, p.3. 
1 See: Temper, L., Demaria, F., Scheidel, A., Del Bene, D., & Martinez-Alier, J. 
(2018). The Global Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas): ecological distribu-
tion conflicts as forces for sustainability. Sustainability Science, 13(3), 573–584. 
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actors, in a context of imbalanced power relations between agribusiness 
investors and prior land users, which are often manifested through 
different levels and mechanisms of coercion. Last, this framework un-
veils how commons grabbed by agribusiness are frequently pushed into 
a transition from subsistence farming and/or small-scale uses of land 
(and other natural resources), to large-scale commercial agriculture 
and/or speculative investments. 
This framework has a central role in our paper for two reasons. 
Firstly, as explained in detail in the methods section, it is used for our 
case selection. Secondly, in our analysis, we zoom in and investigate the 
dynamics of social mobilization, collective reaction, resistance and 
collective action associated with one of its three dimensions, that of 
“coercion”. 
2.2. Theorizing resistance against commons grabbing 
Villamayor-Tomas and García-López (2018) recently described the 
emerging force of social movements and mobilizations as a reaction to 
the different threats to the commons. Their systematic analysis confirms 
the interpretation of critical commons scholars, who depict the history 
of the commons, as one characterized by a dialectic tension between the 
systemic push for capital accumulation on one side, and the resistance of 
commoners and social movements on the other (e.g. De Angelis, 2012). 
Resistance has also been theorized in specific relation to the contem-
porary land grabbing phenomena. Borras and Franco (2013) describe 
the different types of struggles that local communities engage with: 
against expulsion, for incorporation, against land appropriation and 
concentration and for redistribution and recognition. Other authors 
offer theoretical models which help explain resistance or absence of 
resistance to land grabbing and the dynamics of such mobilizations (Hall 
et al., 2015). The Marxist (or Marxian) perspective on collective action 
focuses on the process of enclosure of the commons that has originally 
and continuously granted capital accumulation on an expanded scale 
(Linebaugh, 2009; De Angelis, 2012; Caffentzis and Federici, 2014). 
Capital expansion dispossesses different social groups which resist by 
means of common political projects and class politics (Harvey, 2003; 
Federici and Linebaugh, 2018). The theoretical corpus represented by 
the heterodox theories of social movements argues that there is more 
than just the individualistic Homo oeconomicus behaviours or class 
consciousness theories. According to this perspective, people uniting in 
struggle and resistance can be explained by looking at the role of emo-
tions and affective ties in social movements (Hall et al., 2015). 
Another body of scholarship examines the dynamics of resistance in 
greater detail. For example, Temper, 2019, positions her analysis 
referring to the literature on transnational activism, agrarian resistance 
and politics of scale. Citing (Risse and Sikkink, 1999) and Tarrow 
(1998), she points at how the constructivist approach to study social 
movements highlights how social groups develop norms, beliefs and 
shared expectations of given actors. The act of ‘framing’ –the strategic 
(re-)creation of ideas that generate beliefs– drives, motivates and defines 
strategies and interventions of collective action. Temper also refers to 
the ‘scalar politics’ framework from political ecology, which helps in 
explaining why social activists move from the local up to the interna-
tional level of contention in order to pursue their objectives. In Temper’s 
review, the work of Tarrow (2005) is central in explaining the different 
mechanisms of contentious politics which include: “global framing, 
internalization, diffusion, scale shift, externalization and coalition 
forming” (p. 10). Temper examines the ‘boomerang effect’ (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1999) which argues that weak non-state actors seek allies in the 
international arena to impact repressive policies in their country. This 
hypothesis suggests that transnational support is fundamental in those 
places where actors don’t have enough resources to counteract internal 
high levels of repression. However, in response to critiques that the 
boomerang promotes a paternalistic vision of transnational solidarity, 
where ideas, tactics and know-how, as well as material resources, are 
generated in the core countries and spread to the periphery, Temper 
proposes an analysis that goes beyond the boomerang effect. Echoing 
the allegorical nature of projectile devices that could be employed in 
social resistance, she introduces the “catapult model” (2018, p. 20). 
What this model refers to is the inverse of the boomerang effect: situa-
tions where transnational NGOs find allies on the ground to promote 
reforms and push forward their agenda of resistance. This approach 
restores agency to actors on the ground. It also raises relevant questions 
that may be further empirically tested in our analysis regarding the 
effectiveness of coalitions in collective mobilizations and the role of 
international actors as well as a diversity of local actors joining in 
common cause. 
The different theoretical bodies of scholarship on the politics of 
collective re-action provide a wide range of analytical perspectives that 
can explain what are the collective “reactions from below” to land 
grabbing. Building on these theoretical perspectives, as mentioned 
earlier, we focus our analysis on the coercion and collective re-action 
dimension of agribusiness commons grabbing providing a synthesis of 
a large number of cases from the EJAtlas. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data sources 
The analysis draws on the great wealth of information that has been 
gathered through the Environmental Justice Atlas (Temper, 2019; 
Martínez-Alier et al., 2016). With global coverage of 3300 cases by 
November 2020, the EJAtlas is the largest database on environmental 
conflicts and mobilizations worldwide Environmental Justice Atlas 
(EJAtlas), 2021. 
Each EJAtlas entry documents an environmental conflict and related 
social mobilizations in a standardized manner. Conflicts are categorized 
in one of ten mutually exclusive types (also referred to as “1st level” 
categories) that indicate the sector of the main project in dispute (e.g. 
mining, fossil fuels, water management, waste management, nuclear, 
land and biomass use, and others). Moreover, and aiming to show the 
complexity of these conflicts, the EJAtlas provides more than 50 detailed 
non-exclusive sub-categories of conflict types (also referred to as “2nd 
level category”), such as land acquisition conflicts, hydroelectric dams, 
or the like. For instance, a mining conflict can be linked to land acqui-
sition conflicts and toxic waste treatment and many other sub- 
categories. Furthermore, each entry includes detailed information on 
the commodities involved, relevant actors and companies, the intensity 
of conflict in terms of the scale of mobilizations and level of violence, the 
groups mobilizing for more just and sustainable resource uses, the forms 
of mobilization used, the social, health and economic impacts, as well as 
key conflict outcomes. Information is provided both as qualitative 
descriptive texts, as well as codes that can be used for quantitative an-
alyses. For a definition of these variables see Scheidel et al. (2020). 
The EJAtlas only documents conflicts that are verifiable through 
previously published secondary sources. Data collection is based on a 
collaborative process during which academic researchers, journalists, 
civil society actors, social movement and non-governmental organiza-
tions members, can register in the EJAtlas to identify environmental 
conflicts and provide information and secondary sources on conflict 
events. Data are gathered and cross-checked from a variety of secondary 
sources, including academic articles, civil society reports, news articles, 
lawsuits, formal complaints or petitions. Such non-academic informa-
tion sources on local conflict dynamics and events are frequently used in 
diverse research on environmental conflicts and social mobilizations (e. 
g. Escobar, 1998; Earl et al. 2004; Gerber, 2011). 
One frequent concern arising from the use of diverse non-academic 
sources is about potential bias, such as conflict coverage, which we 
discuss below, or descriptions of violent events by, or against, protesters. 
For the case of newspaper sources, Earl et al. (2004) show that ‘hard 
facts’, such as violent events, tend to be reported quite accurately, while 
biases are more frequently introduced for ‘soft facts’ such as actor 
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opinion, or protest motivations. Where possible, triangulation of infor-
mation through various information sources is an important step to 
enhance data quality. Such quality checks of the provided information, 
particularly on sensitive information such as violent events, are pursued 
through a permanent team of case moderators who also assures 
consistent coding of conflicts through the EJAtlas data form. See Temper 
et al. (2015) and Temper (2016) for further explanation of the EJAtlas’ 
methodology and mapping process. 
The resulting EJAtlas database represents a large convenience sam-
ple of an unknown total of recent environmental conflicts worldwide. 
These sample characteristics entail several implications and limitations 
for data analysis and interpretation that should be considered. First, due 
to a lack of coverage, information and collaborators for different re-
gions, the EJAtlas has an uneven geographical coverage and should not 
be considered as a statistically representative sample. Some regions and 
countries are documented with a greater number of conflicts than 
others, not necessarily because there are more conflicts on the ground, 
but also because of better availability of conflict documentation and 
collaborators. This limits, for example, the possibilities for comparisons 
across countries and continents and the data employed here should not 
be used to compare countries regarding specific conflict events. Second, 
the lack of coverage of some regions may particularly affect the repre-
sentation of specific actors affected by commons grabbing in these re-
gions. Specifically, the entire EJAtlas database, as well as the subset of 
cases analyzed in this article, has limited coverage on Central Asia, 
Central Africa, and Mongolia. Given that in these regions, there are 
diffuse commons used by pastoralist (eg. Brondizio and Le Tourneau, 
2016), we are aware that pastoralist conflicts are underrepresented in 
this study. This implies that it may make up a larger share of commons 
conflicts than indicated by our results. 
3.2. Sample selection 
To characterize patterns and main features of social mobilization, 
resistances and organized collective re-actions that are taking place as a 
response to commons grabbing produced by agribusiness Large-Scale 
Land Acquisitions, this paper provides an analytical synthesis of all 
the EJAtlas agribusiness cases related to land acquisition conflicts. The 
operational assumption here is that, following Dell’Angelo et al.’s 
(2017) framework for “commons grabbing” in the context of agribusi-
ness development, we are dealing with cases that can be illustrative of 
the dynamics of commons dispossession. The case selection was done 
through a three-step screening process, during which the entire EJAtlas 
database (including all cases registered up to December 2018, n = 2641) 
was reduced to 185 cases relevant for this study. 
During the first step, we filtered for all cases that were characterized 
as “land acquisition conflicts” (2nd level category), and involved at least 
one of these commodities related to agribusiness: coffee, cotton, cellu-
lose, corn/maize, jatropha, rubber, palm oil, soybeans, sugar, ethanol, 
wheat, rice, cut flowers, fruits and vegetables, live animals, fish, 
shrimps, timber, eucalyptus, pine, carbon offsets, biological resources. 
This resulted in a total of 253 conflicts. During the second step, 
following Dell’Angelo et al.’s (2017) definition of grabbed commons in 
the context of agribusiness development, we further selected only those 
conflicts overlapping with agribusiness activities. This included cases 
with at least one the following 2nd level categories: “Plantation conflicts 
including pulp”, “deforestation”, “Intensive food production mono-
culture and livestock”, “Agrofuels and biomass energy plants”, “Water 
access rights and entitlements”, “Logging and non-timber extraction”, 
“Agrotoxics” and “GMOs”. In this process, 36 cases were excluded as not 
relevant, resulting in a sample of 217 cases. For instance, land acquisi-
tion conflicts related to large-scale tourism projects or as a result of 
conservation and biodiversity regarding REDD+ were excluded. During 
the third step, we screened the qualitative information by revising the 
“description” and “project details” fields, to further identify whether the 
case was linked to agribusiness activities or not, which led to the further 
exclusion of 32 cases. A total of 185 cases were eventually analyzed 
(Fig. 2, A). From the total of cases only 18 report an “end date” which 
means that 167 of these conflicts (90%) are ongoing, or no information 
was available on whether the conflict ended. In addition, from the 185 
cases, we further narrowed down and specifically conducted a second 
round of analysis for a subset of 72 cases that are classified as “high 
intensity conflicts” (Fig. 2, B). 
From a total of 185 analyzed cases, 64 countries, mostly from the 
global South, were included. Specifically, the following countries had 
the majority of cases: Indonesia (32 cases), Brazil (15 cases), Cambodia 
(15 cases), Colombia (7 cases) and Mozambique (6 cases). All these were 
cases of agribusiness related conflicts which were associated with spe-
cific agricultural commodities and resources. Among these commod-
ities, the top 5 reported categories are land (n = 107), palm oil (n = 73), 
timber (n = 44), water (n = 23) and sugar (n = 33). 
4. Results 
We first direct our analysis to address five overarching questions: 1. 
What types of actors are mobilizing? 2. When did the mobilization begin? 3. 
What forms of mobilization are happening? 4. What type of outcomes did the 
reactions lead to? 5. What is the level of mobilization and intensity of violence 
associated with the conflict? 6. What typologies of violence affect different 
types of actors? After addressing these questions, we focus on the 
dimension of coercion in commons grabbing and unpack the variety of 
dynamics that can be related to it by analyzing the subset of 72 cases that 
Fig. 2. A. Geographical distribution of all selected land acquisition conflict cases (n = 185); B. high intensity land acquisition conflict cases subset (n = 72).  
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are classified as “high intensity conflicts” to specifically illustrate the 
features and characteristics of cases with higher levels of confrontation 
and violence. 
4.1. What types of actors are mobilizing? 
According to EJAtlas data, the groups that mobilize most frequently 
in land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness are ‘Local EJOs2’ 
(69%), ‘indigenous groups’ (66%) ‘farmers’ (66%) and ‘neighbors, citi-
zens communities’ (36%). ‘Women’ (20%) and ‘landless peasants’ (18%) 
appears to be also relevant group of protesters. As Fig. 3 shows, ‘inter-
national EJOs’ (58%), ‘scientists’ (23%) and wider ‘social movements’ 
(22%), “often play a role in supporting locally organized movements. It 
is worth to note that of most of the analyzed cases involve several 
groups, and that protesters may belong to different social groups. 
Furthermore, governmental actors are sometimes drivers of land con-
flicts, but in different occasions they can also act as supporters to 
environmental and land defenders. For instance, ‘local governmental 
and political parties’ mobilize against agribusiness land acquisition in 
22% of the cases”. 
4.2. When did the mobilization begin? 
The EJAtlas gives information about the temporality of reaction from 
the mobilizing groups against the conflictive projects. It categorizes in 
five excluding categories, in ‘reaction’ (referring to mobilizations that 
happen after the project implementation started, or during the operation 
of the project), ‘preventive’ (referring to mobilizations that start before 
project implementation), ‘for reparation’ (referring to mobilizations that 
start after the project has already produced tangible socio- 
environmental negative effects), ‘latent’ when there is no visible resis-
tance, but mobilizations might appear anytime soon, and ‘unknown’ 
when there is no information available on protest start. The selected 
cases were mostly categorized as ‘reactive’ protests (65%), occurring 
during the construction or operation of the project that lead to a land 
grabbing process. In 22% of the cases, the mobilization was ‘preventive’ 
and finally, in 5% of the cases the mobilization took action for ‘repa-
rations’. Latent conflicts reach 4% (Fig. 4). 
4.3. - What forms of mobilization are happening? 
There is a variety of actions and mobilizing forms that take place in 
response to the studied agribusiness LSLAs (Fig. 5). These forms range 
from oppositional collective actions such as strikes (~5%), occupation 
of public spaces (~6%), boycotting -both products or official proced-
ures- (~4%), street protests (~51%) and land occupation (~ 21%) to 
less confrontational actions such as public campaigns (~35%), official 
letters and petitions (~59%) and to more reformative and propositional 
approaches such as the development of alternative proposals (~21%). 
Judicial activism (~ 39%) (the use of state institutions, national and 
international legal tools to leverage land struggles) is common. Some 
forms of mobilization may be potentially violent, such as property 
damage (~ 16%) and sabotage (~5%). Moreover, in the majority of 
cases (65%) local movements built alliances with NGOs and Interna-
tional Organizations. Mobilizing forms are not mutually exclusive, on 
average more than 5 forms of mobilizing are used for each case. For 
instance, on March 8th 2006, 3000 women from the Landless Workers’ 
Movement (MST) and la Via Campesina jointly occupied eucalyptus 
nurseries in Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, they used a diversity of mobi-
lization forms and only eventually destroyed more than five million 
seedlings EJAtlas (2017b). They denounced “the social and environ-
mental consequences of the advance of the monoculture of eucalyptus in 
their lands and condemned what they called “green latifundia” and/or 
“green deserts”. They made claims against the high use of water in these 
monocultures and because of the use of chlorine in the bleaching process 
of the eucalyptus pulp which might cause health damages. 
Fig. 3. Frequency of group mobilized in land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that groups are not 
mutually exclusive. 
2 Local Environmental Justice Organizations (EJOs) refers to civil society 
organizations or informal collectives involved in the conflicts at a local scale. 
They thus have a local profile, as their scope and influence focusses on a specific 
territory, or on country level. They include NGOs and grassroots organizations 
such as formal and informal associations. 
J. Dell’Angelo et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004
6
These forms of actions vary in terms of degree of contestation 
ranging from propositional approaches and formal procedures, building 
networks and alliances, generating new information, to different types 
of confrontational actions, non-violent and potentially violent ones 
(Fig. 9). 
4.4. What type of outcomes did the reactions lead to? 
A variety of key events and outcomes have been coded in the EJAtlas 
that occur over the duration of the land acquisition conflicts (Fig. 6). 
They range from different forms of repression to policy changes and 
modifications to the project. The most frequent outcomes are described 
in the different forms that violence against those who mobilize takes 
shape. Repression (37%), migration and displacement (35%), violent 
targeting (32%) and criminalization of activists (32%) are some of the 
most frequently described categories with several instances of environ-
mental and land activists assassinated (24%). The occurrence of 
repression for this data sample is substantially higher than the global 
average of cases reported for all EJAtlas cases (see Scheidel et al., 2020), 
which points to the coercive nature of commons grabbing. It appears 
that in these types of land acquisition conflicts, institutional responses 
available through state apparatus, public officials and implementation 
Fig. 5. Frequency of mobilizations forms reported to protest in land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note 
that variables are not mutually exclusive. 
Fig. 4. Frequency of temporality of reaction against the project. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that variables are mutually exclusive.  
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of laws and policies, such as the application of existing regulations 
(17%), the creation of new legislation (11%), and in general, institu-
tional changes (8%), are relatively less frequent. This might be the case 
in many conflicts mapped in Brazil, where grassroots movement lever-
aged policy and institutional frameworks for the creation of “Reservas 
Extractivistas” which are a legal instrument for the creation of protected 
areas where the traditional populations can continue its activities with 
no risk of being expropriated. 
4.5. What is the level of mobilization and the intensity of violence 
associated with the different conflicts? 
The ‘intensity level’ is a variable that combines both levels of direct 
and physical violence within the conflict and the scale of the mobiliza-
tions (number of people involved) (Fig. 7). The largest share (37% of 
analyzed cases), are conflicts of ‘high intensity’, characterized by mass 
mobilizations and/or arrests, criminalization, violence and even mur-
ders. Key examples of such high intensity conflicts include the “Massacre 
Fig. 6. Frequency of outcomes of land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness activities. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that outcomes are 
not mutually exclusive; cases involve commonly several outcomes. 
Fig. 7. Frequency of intensity level of land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that variables are 
mutually exclusive. 
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of Curuguaty”, in Paraguay where on June 2015, 11 peasants and six 
policemen were killed as a result of violent evictions of peasants who 
had occupied the lands of Marina Kue to stop the increased sowing of 
transgenic soybeans (EJAtlas, 2017a). Another example is the Garifuna 
resistance in Honduras against land grabbing for palm oil plantations 
where local communities “are threatened by eviction, displacement, 
intimidation and criminal violence” (EJAtlas, 2015a). This subset of 
‘high intensity conflicts’ is analyzed more in detail in Section 4.7. In 32% 
of the cases, conflicts fall under the definition of ‘medium intensity’, 
which refers to visible mobilizations such as street protests but occurring 
at a smaller scale, and without an excessive level of violence. Low in-
tensity conflicts account for 21% of the cases and usually refer to some 
local mobilizations and dissent. 6% is unknown and 5% latent (4%) 
which refers to those conflicts where there is no visible resistance 
beyond the everyday forms of resistance termed “weapons of the weak” 
by Scott(Scott, 2008) but signals that there might be in future. Such 
cases also include those where NGOs are mobilizing but no outright 
mobilization by the local community. 
4.6. What typologies of violence affect different types of actors? 
Small-scale farmers, indigenous people, landless peasants, pastoral-
ists and traditional forest users are the actors that are most directly 
affected by land and commons grabbing (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). In 
this study, we find that for those cases where these groups are mobilizing 
groups- repression and criminalization are occurring systematically 
(Fig. 8). Moreover, in a large number of cases violent targeting and also 
killings are reported. Fig. 8 shows the frequency of deaths in cases where 
pastoralists, landless peasants, indigenous groups or small-scale farmers 
were involved in the mobilization. We see that respectively in 20%, 
39%, 27% and 27% of the analyzed conflicts in which pastoralists, 
landless peasants, indigenous groups or small-scale farmers were 
involved in some form of social mobilization and resistance, the killing 
of one or more activists involved was reported. 
Frequency of repressive outcomes associated to the involvement of 
different actors depending on the commons. 
4.7. Zooming in: high intensity conflict cases 
From the 185 cases we further narrow down our analysis to 72 cases 
that are classified as ‘high intensity conflicts’. Of these 72 high intensity 
conflicts, the highest number occurred in Brazil (9 cases) Cambodia (9 
cases) and Indonesia (8 cases). These are followed by Colombia (5 
cases), Mexico (4 cases), Paraguay, India and Thailand (3 cases each), 
and several more countries in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia with one or two cases. 
4.7.1. Conflict types 
All these 72 cases are classified as ‘land acquisition conflicts’, of 
these, as non-exclusive sub-categories, 51% are described as ‘plantation 
conflicts’, 39% associated with the issue of ‘deforestation’, 33% related 
with ‘intensive food production, monocultures and livestock’, 18% with 
‘agrofuels and biomass energy production’, 18% associated with ‘log-
ging’ and 13% with issues of ‘water access rights and entitlements’. 
4.7.2. Agricultural commodities 
The types of agricultural commodities that are more frequently listed 
include ‘palm oil’ (35%), ‘timber’ (29%), ‘sugar’ (19%), ‘eucalyptus’ 
(11%), ‘soybean’ (8%), ‘fruits and vegetables’ (8%), ‘cellulose’ (8%), 
and ‘rubber’ (6%). 
4.7.3. Actors mobilizing 
The frequencies for the types of actors that mobilize in high intensity 
conflicts are similar to the broader sample. Also, for high intensity 
conflict cases, farmers (76%), indigenous groups (71%), local environ-
mental justice organizations (69%) and international environmental 
justice organizations (56%), communities (49%) and landless peasants 
(32%) are the main categories of groups that mobilize most frequently. 
4.7.4. Forms of mobilization 
A visible characteristic of the high intensity conflicts cases subset is 
the increased use of specific mobilization forms. Particularly high fre-
quencies, compared with the broader sample, are reported for ‘street 
protests’ (76%), ‘public campaigns’ (49%), ‘blockades’ (42%), ‘land 
Fig. 8. Frequency of repressive outcomes associated with the involvement of different actors impacted by the agribusiness operations. Own elaboration from EJAtlas 
data (n = 185). Note that variables are not mutually exclusive. 
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occupation’ (44%), ‘occupation of public spaces’ (17%), ‘boycotts of 
official procedures’ (10%), ‘boycotts of companies and products’ (10%), 
‘property damage’ (28%) and ‘threats to use arms” (13%). 
4.7.5. Forms of repression and violence 
In line with the high intensity classification of this subset, these cases 
are subject to a variety of dynamics of violent ‘repression’ (63% of the 
cases) with visible increase in ‘militarization’ (49%) and ‘violent tar-
geting of activists’ (67%). In the majority of cases ‘violation of human 
rights’ (71%) is denounced and ‘criminalization of activists’ (56%) is 
common practice. In 78% of cases, killing of an activist was a reported 
outcome. For instance, Human Rights Watch (2014) published a report 
about the land conflict in Bajo Aguán, Honduras, titled “There Are No 
Investigations Here”. Politicians have apparently aided the allocation of 
land rights to private companies through a string of agrarian reform 
laws. In this case, Dinant Corporation started to evict local peasants from 
their lands for the purpose of monoculture Palm Oil plantations. 
Reportedly, protest was met with torture, arson, intimidation, disap-
pearances and murder of activists, the majority of which was not 
investigated (Edelman and León, 2013; EJAtlas, 2014a). 
4.7.6. Socio-economic impacts 
The groups that are subject to high intensity conflict, in addition to 
direct violence, suffer a variety of socio-economic impacts (see Fig. 10). 
The most prominent ones include land dispossession, loss of livelihood 
and displacement. For instance, in Sumatra Indonesia, PT Tor Ganda 
annexed over 10, 000 acres of forest and subsistence land for mono-
culture conversion, supposedly without permits. The march which was 
subsequently organized by the local farmers was attacked by “hoodlums 
and police”, which burned over 100 houses, wounding 30 and killing 1. 
Further resistance could not be mounted and villages definitively lost 
their land and thus livelihood (EJAtlas, 2016). 
4.7.7. Alliances 
In high intensity conflicts, alliances between local actors affected by 
land and commons grabbing and other groups supporting their struggle 
play a fundamental role. In the majority of cases analyzed protesters are 
composed of a variety of actors operating at different scales, such as 
international environmental justice organizations (involved in 56% of 
cases), national and international NGOs (63%), and local environmental 
justice organizations (69%) (Fig. 11, below). Researchers, scientist and 
professionals on the ground are often involved (31%) as well as social 
movements (29%). In a large part of the sample (47%), one of the 
strategies of resistance and mobilization is explicitly developing a 
network for collective and coordinated action. An infamous example is 
the KDC land grab case in Cambodia. In this case numerous villagers 
Fig. 9. Characteristics of mobilization forms for all cases (n = 185) and for high intensity conflict cases subset (n = 72). Own elaboration from EJAtlas, major changes 
in values highlighted in red. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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were evicted from their farmland by the Cambodian company KDC, 
owned by political elites. After a first appeal the courts ruled against the 
local farmers. Formal complaints were rejected and the KDC started to 
evict families by force and destroy farmers’ houses. Eventually, the 
involvement of 25 NGOs and human rights organizations lead the UN to 
start an investigation. These activities lead to a temporary suspension of 
the eviction activities (EJAtlas, 2015b). 
5. Discussion 
In this paper we identify and synthesize emerging patterns of 
violence, resistance and social mobilization through an analysis of 185 
cases of land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness development 
which following Dell’Angelo et al. (2017) framework for “commons 
grabbing” are cases illustrative of the dynamics of commons disposses-
sion in the context of the global land rush. 
Fig. 11. Frequency of key allies in high intensity violence cases. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 72). Note that variables are not mutually exclusive.  
Fig. 10. Frequency of socio-economic impacts on impacted groups in high intensity violence cases. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 72). Note that variables 
are not mutually exclusive. 
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In terms of types of actors that mobilize, local organizations are the 
actors that mobilize most frequently in the analyzed cases (Fig. 3). This 
highlights the important role of communities in forms of collective re-
actions. This key role of the collective dimension of land struggles 
against coercive measures is frequently overseen in media reports, who 
tend to depict the stories of individual land defenders, and invisible in 
recent global statistics of killings of land and environmental defenders 
(cf. Scheidel et al., 2020). Recognition of the collective nature of these 
struggles is however important, to unveil the efforts as well as risks faced 
by the collectives to which they belong to, in protecting and defending 
the commons against outside appropriators. Indigenous people, pasto-
ralists, and to a certain extent small-scale farmer, are typically the users 
most affected through processes of commons grabbing because of their 
dependence on land (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). This is reflected in the 
frequent appearance of indigenous and farmers as mobilizing groups, 
both in the broader sample (Fig. 3) and in the ‘high intensity conflicts 
sub-set, whereas we explain the lower observed frequency of pastoralists 
due to our geographical sample distribution (Fig. 2, see also Section 3). 
Resistance can throw historically antagonistic actors, such as farmers 
and pastoralists into “marriages of convenience” or temporary alliances 
(Temper, 2016), as they strategize together how to stop communal land, 
with its overlapping and contested land claims, from being converted 
into commercial private operations. 
The prominent role of international organizations in these conflicts is 
clear. International Environmental Organizations are involved in 58% of 
the conflicts analyzed and 63% of those which are high intensity. This 
rate of involvement is about double the global average for all cases 
registered in the EJAtlas (30%, as reported in Scheidel et al., 2020). This 
frequency may signal a bias in reporting of cases with international 
campaigns pushed by international organizations, and points to the 
different models of resistance described by Temper (2019), where alli-
ances between local and international actors, either through 
“boomerang” or “catapult” models, shape the dynamics of commons- 
grabbing resistance. It is also an indication of the high capacity and 
prominence of agrarian and rural social movements to mobilize on the 
global policy and advocacy stage. As McKeon (2013) argues, they have 
exploited the political window of opportunity opened up by global 
attention on land-grabbing to push for representation and rights for 
peasants in spaces such as in the Committee on World Food Security, the 
negotiation of Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests and the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Peasants and other people working in rural areas, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in December 2018. This last declaration includes 
specific safeguards for the commons, as in Article 17, which affirms 
peasants’ right to land individually or collectively and which charges 
that States shall recognize and protect the natural commons and their 
related systems of collective use and management (UN General Assem-
bly, 2018). Threats from globalization seem to produce globalized an-
tidotes. Transnational alliance building among peasants, rural peoples 
and national and international organizations defending the commons 
thus demonstrates the potential for greater organization and 
effectiveness. 
These aspects confirm precedent theoretical elaborations. First it 
raises attention on the role of social movements in governing the com-
mons, which has been extensively described by Villamayor-Tomas and 
García-López (2018) in supporting collective re-actions and defending 
the commons. Actors affected by commons grabbing are not only united 
in dealing with the same threats, but they actually organize in collective 
re-actions. The term ‘re-action’ is particularly appropriated to describe 
the development of these collective actions. Looking at when the mobi-
lization begins, it is clear that in the large majority of the cases these 
groups mobilized in reaction to the projects and the acquisitions that 
they confronted. This aspect brings to light several important aspects, 
one is that it raises the concern that despite the narrative on ‘informed 
consent’ that is often invoked when describing the implementation of 
large-scale agribusiness ventures, local actors seem to resort to collective 
reactions when the project is already in advanced planning phase. This 
gives some important insights on the level (and lack) of participation 
and how these communities are involved (or excluded in most cases) in 
the decision-making processes associated with agribusiness develop-
ment. What clearly emerges is that most of the times local communities 
seem to become aware of the project implications once it is already 
launched. For example, in a case involving the Texas- based Nile Trade 
Development, the local community only discovered the deal three years 
after the initial signing (EJAtlas 2014b). 
Another aspect that emerges from this work, which we believe is a 
novel contribution to the theory of the commons, is that organized 
collective (re)actions are critical not only in the maintenance and 
governance of the commons, but they evidently play a role in their de-
fense. In terms of the forms of mobilization, it is interesting to observe that 
in the majority of the cases the actions were peaceful, often following 
institutional and propositional approaches rather than confrontational 
ones. However, there are some relevant differences between the fre-
quency in all cases and the ones in the high intensity conflicts sub-set. 
For the high intensity conflicts confrontational actions are reported 
more frequently. For example, occupations of public spaces, boycotting 
formal procedures, companies and products, blockades, street protests, 
land occupation, property damage, and threat to use arms occur much 
more often in the high intensity conflict sub-set. 
A disconcerting outcome from this synthesis is that while on the side 
of the collective re-actions it seems clear that the prevailing patterns of 
organization are peaceful, the social outcomes that result are frequently 
violent, involving also assassinations (see also Del Bene et al., 2018). 
More than a third of the cases that we analyzed were described as ‘high 
intensity conflicts’. Among the ‘high intensity conflicts’, in 30% of the 
cases direct violence against the mobilizing groups is reported. In 
particular the social outcomes resulting from the mobilizations show a 
high level of oppression and violence. Repression, displacement, violent 
targeting, criminalization and assassination of activist are much more 
frequent than other non-violent social outcomes such as legislative and 
institutional changes. In addition to confirming one of the main results 
from Dell’Angelo et al. (2017), that the dynamics of commons grabbing 
are inherently characterized by power imbalance, coercion and 
violence, this synthesis brings novel information and characterizations 
about the ways in which coercion and violence manifest more 
frequently. What results from this work is that there seems to be a 
structural dynamic of oppression that starts from the violation of com-
munities and collective interests, which then leads to collective re- 
actions, that eventually are suppressed through coercion and violence. 
We have not investigated in this paper how this repression might cause 
backfire leading to increased public outrage and support and eventual 
government accommodation to the protesters demands (Hess and Mar-
tin, 2006). However, given the paucity of positive outcomes in high 
intensity cases, it appears that such dynamics are rare. 
The fact that violence is a recurrent pattern to suppress environ-
mental defenders is very problematic (Navas et al., 2018). In addition to 
its human rights violation aspect, it suppresses fundamental emerging 
forces for sustainability (Scheidel et al., 2018). The way in which the 
commons are being threatened through the advancement of neoliberal 
frontiers of transnational resources exploitation, and the way in which 
the resulting organized social re-actions displayed in defense of these 
commons are systematically suppressed, raise environmental and po-
litical concerns. There is evidence that commons systems are often able 
to ensure environmental sustainability (Cox et al., 2010) and it has been 
clearly explained how ecological distribution conflicts play a key role in 
denouncing and proposing alternatives to mechanisms of natural 
resource exploitation that are unsustainable (Scheidel et al., 2018). In 
this light, the collective reactions organized to resist commons grabbing 
should be seen, recognized and safeguarded as valuable forces for 
sustainability. 
A key issue lies in the problematic role of governments and the social 
and economic forces that hegemonize the State apparatuses and 
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organizations in governing the commons in the contemporary era of 
neoliberal globalization. According to Mansbridge (2014), the State 
could potentially support the autonomous self-organization of common 
property systems thorough (i) the imposition of intermediate solutions 
when local parties cannot reach a shared agreement, (ii) the provision of 
relatively neutral information, (iii) the provision of an arena for nego-
tiation and agreement discussion, and (iv) the social infrastructure for 
monitoring, compliance and sanctioning mechanisms. However, the 
critical arguments about the deficiencies associated with state-centric 
forms of commons governance are amply debated and touch upon 
even more fundamental questions on self-organization, participation, 
democracy and cooperation (see Cumbers, 2015). As seen in our results 
(Fig. 6), available institutional measures, such as the use of existing laws 
to safeguard the environment and human rights, or the creation of new 
laws to protect people and commons land, are often not implemented. 
The problematic role of the State apparatuses and organizations is also a 
critical aspect that emerges from the recent body of literature on the 
global land rush. As synthesized in Dell’Angelo et al. (2017), when it 
comes to economically powerful interests such as the ones associated 
with transnational large-scale land investments, the “face” of the State 
that more often manifests, is the one exhibited by national governments 
that have a key role in allocating exclusive land concessions to powerful 
foreign investors. This happens not only by disregarding the traditional 
users that rely on these resources, but also through the active suppres-
sion by governmental forces, often violent, of any type of reactions and 
claim organized by the communities and people affected by these 
investments. 
6. Conclusions 
Commons grabbing has been described as a constitutive element of 
the contemporary global agrarian transition. The recent global land 
rush, catalyzed through transnational agribusiness expansion, is 
happening at the expenses of the commons. Large-scale land acquisitions 
resulting from agribusiness development are a key driver of this esca-
lating process (eg. Wily, 2011a, 2011b; Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). There 
is evidence that commons grabbing is perpetuated through coercive 
means and violence (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). Using a different data-
base, this study confirms a similar depiction of coercion and violence 
associated with agribusiness related commons grabbing. While it has 
been shown that in many instances of commons grabbing associated 
with LSLAs, different types of social conflict emerge, it is less clear what 
forms of social mobilization and organized collective re-actions are 
taking place to defend the commons against such processes of dispos-
session. This paper addressed this gap shedding light on some of the 
fundamental questions associated with the fundamental characteristics, 
forms and patterns of collective re-actions and mobilizations that are 
organized in defense of the commons. This is a novel contribution to the 
scholarship and theory of the commons, which has prevalently focused 
on the conditions and dynamics of collective actions that are associated 
with sustainable maintenance of common pool resources, but has placed 
less focus on the exogenous drivers of change and external pressures. 
With this paper we describe some emerging features, strategies and 
patterns associated with the mobilizations that different actors organize 
as collective reactions against commons grabbing. Considering the 
concerning levels of dispossession, violence and coercion, the necessity 
of alliances and coordinated strategies between communities, local and 
international actors, becomes of fundamental importance in defending 
the commons. 
The recent wave of land grabbing associated with the contemporary 
global land rush clearly raises some new challenges for the commons. As 
scholars interested in the commons, in sustainability and social and 
environmental justice we have to deal with new emerging theoretical 
challenges to some of the fundamental tenets of the theory of the com-
mons. New challenges are raised but there are also emerging opportu-
nities. In this light, particularly important is the role that social 
movements and environmental justice networks could play in commons 
governance, as well as the role that the collective re-actions organized to 
defend the commons, will have in producing positive political change 
and development of social and environmental alternatives (Aydin et al., 
2017; Villamayor-Tomas and García-López, 2018) against the 
advancement of socially and environmentally exploitive systems of 
natural resources grabbing. 
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Velicu, I., García-López, G., 2018. Thinking the commons through Ostrom and Butler: 
boundedness and vulnerability. Theor. Cult. Soc. 35 (6), 55–73. 
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